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A new series entitled Oxford Philosophical Concepts (OPC) made its debut in November 2014. As 
the series’ Editor Christia Mercer notes, this series is an attempt to respond to the call for and the 
tendency of many philosophers to invigorate the discipline. To that end each volume will rethink a 
central concept in the history of philosophy, e.g. efficient causation, health, evil, eternity, etc. “Each OPC 
volume is a history of its concept in that it tells a story about changing solutions to specific philosophical 
problems” (xiii). The series presents itself as innovative along three main lines: its reexamination of the 
so-called “canon,” its reconsidering the value of interdisciplinary exchanges, and its encouraging 
philosophers to move beyond the current borders of philosophy. By engaging with non-Western 
traditions and carefully considering topics and materials which are not strictly philosophical, the 
collections from this series aim to render the history of philosophy accessible to a wide audience. 
The first OPC volume to appear in print is “Efficient Causation – A History” edited by Tad 
Schmaltz. Using careful historical and philosophical analysis as well as interdisciplinary reflections this 
anthology proposes to tell the story of how efficient causation, equated nowadays with “causation” tout 
court, came to play its prominent role in our philosophical and scientific vocabulary. Eleven 
contributions cover the period from Ancient times (Aristotle and the Stoics), through the Middle Ages 
(both the Western and the Islamic traditions), passing through the Early Modern times (represented 
here by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Malebranche, Berkeley and Hume), all the way to Kant and finally 
contemporary philosophers (classified into two opposing camps: Humean and Neo-Aristotelian). There 
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are also four reflections which explore the applications of the notion of efficient causation to areas 
different from philosophy, especially the arts (literature, music, painting, etc.).  
In the Introduction, the volume’s editor Tad Schmaltz addresses methodological questions 
stemming from Kuhn-inspired worries about incommensurability. Schmaltz  states: “If there is a chain of 
development that connects earlier to later concepts, there may well be sufficient overlap to warrant a 
history of the concept-type that comprises historically diverse concept-instances” (6). Let us trace the 
chain of development this anthology uncovers. We will look at each essay and briefly characterize the 
elements that push the concept of “efficient causation” along its path toward its contemporary use. 
Although, chronologically Aristotle marks the acknowledged start of this history, Reflection One 
takes us back to a time long before Aristotle. By means of an analysis of Homeric passages recounting 
Achilles’ withdrawal from battle, Tobias Myers raises questions that are still at the forefront of 
metaphysical inquiry nowadays, e.g.:  “Can omissions be causes?” and “What is the connection between 
causal responsibility and moral responsibility?”.  In Chapter One, Thomas Tuozzo mentions the Atomists 
Democritus and Leucippus who proposed a model of efficient causation close to the mechanistic billiard 
balls we are so familiar with. Tuozzo notes that Aristotle sharply criticizes these Atomist thinkers and 
prefers to make Anaxagoras’ “unmixed Mind” his paradigm of an efficient cause. Aristotle’s efficient 
cause is “where the first beginning of the change or being at rest [comes] from” (26); “that which brings 
the potentiality in the thing moved into actuality” (29). It is also “necessarily unmoved- unmoved, that is 
to say, with respect to the motion it originates” (28).  
The Stoics are the next important stop on our journey. R.J. Hankinson provides the canonical 
Stoic definition of cause: “a body which brings about in another body an incorporeal predicate” (55); or 
more precisely, “a’s being G is a cause to b of b’s being F” (65). However, in order to safeguard 
responsibility, the Stoics emphasize the agent as the proper referent of the term “cause.” Hankinson 
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shows that despite the emphasis they placed on the idea that all causes are bodily, because the Stoic 
theory of causation is closely linked with their materialist physics, providentialist theology, and 
compatibilist view of human action, we should be cautious about attributing to the Stoics the 
contemporary concept of efficient causation.  
In Chapter Three, Ian Wilks guides us through the period between the first centuries of the 
Common Era and the eleventh-twelfth centuries, from infusing Christianity into pagan thought to re-
infusing pagan thought into the Christianity of the Latin West. As a result of the influence of Platonism 
true efficient causality is restricted to incorporeal beings (in the works of Augustine and John Scotus 
Eriugena, among others). Explanations of natural phenomena were thought to require appeals to final, 
rather than efficient, causes.  Later, starting with the eleventh century, non-Platonic themes begin to 
emerge in the writings of Anselm, Adelard of Bath, and William of Conches. Although twelfth-century 
physicists give physical bodies an increasing role in causal explanations, they all work within a theistic 
belief system based on the following hierarchy: divine generation is the prime instance of efficient 
causation; then comes humanly sourced generation; and finally nongenerative efficient causation (101).            
Later Medieval philosophers (eleventh to fourteenth centuries, roughly from Avicenna to 
Ockham) make the move opposite to that of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages by extending the 
label “efficient cause” to creative rational as well as natural agents (105). In keeping with the series’ 
commitment to recover so-far-neglected traditions, Kara Richardson (chapter four) brings to our 
attention the contributions of Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ghazali, and Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Influential ideas 
developed during this period include the definition of the efficient cause as a giver of being (in Ibn Sina - 
108) and the view that causal necessity is akin to logical necessity (a view rejected by Ghazali who, 
nonetheless, contributed to its later popularity - 115-117).  
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Ockham anticipated a more modern view which will eventually allow for the possibility of 
efficient causation without final causation. In Chapter Five, Tad Schmaltz maintains that the Early 
Modern Scholastic Francisco Suarez (1548-1617) continues this trend and gives efficient causes a type of 
priority (without going as far as completely separating them from final causes - 143). The priority of 
efficient causes is also stressed by René Descartes. Schmaltz proves that Descartes’ break with the past 
is not quite as clean as the standard narrative concerning the history of philosophy suggests. This is 
shown by the fact that Descartes uses terms and principles strikingly similar to those employed by 
Suarez in his Metaphysical Disputations as well as by the similar ways they both deal with body-body 
causation in physics and with mind-body interaction.                         
The Stoics held that the primary and proximate causes necessitate their effects (81). Ibn Sina 
also endorsed the necessitation of effects by their causes (116). In Chapter Six, Martin Lin seeks the 
reasons for which Early Modern Philosophers (e.g. Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, Malebranche, Spinoza as 
well as Leibniz - 165) were committed to the view that the type of necessity involved in the connection 
between cause and effect is akin to logical or absolute necessity. After close textual analysis Lin 
concludes that Spinoza’s endorsement of this position is motivated by the commitment to the principle 
of sufficient reason. On the other hand, Leibniz (who also allows for final causation) is forced to accept 
the logical necessity of efficient causal relations by his account of essences.  
Lisa Downing (chapter seven) brings to the fore the problem of occasionalism in Malebranche 
and Berkeley. In the twelfth century, the Arabic philosopher Ghazali had already argued that God is the 
only genuine efficient cause (114). Later, some philosophers (e.g. Gabriel Biel) who espouse sine qua 
non causality refer to their view as “occasionalist” (113). There are also occasionalist readings of 
Descartes’ philosophy (e.g. Daniel Garber’s interpretation, mentioned by Schmaltz – 157). Downing 
contends that both Malebranche and Berkeley were aware of and tried to account for the consequences 
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of Newtonian physics. Malebranche’s solution was the identification of bodily forces with the divine 
creative will. Berkeley, on the other hand, treats bodily forces as technical notions in mechanics with no 
metaphysical import. Berkeley holds that physics deals with regularities (as opposed to the genuine 
causes of metaphysics), thus prefiguring Hume.           
Hume rejects metaphysical distinctions among various types of causes and proposes an 
understanding of causation simply in terms of constant conjunction and a mental expectation that an 
event will follow from a given cause. P.J.E. Kail distinguishes between the “modesty” interpretation 
(Hume dealt with what causation is for us) and the “immodesty” one (Hume dealt with what causation is 
in itself). According to Kail, the necessity Hume claims our idea of causation must include is not that of 
the causal relata themselves but that of the way in which we are compelled to think about these relata. 
This lends support to the modesty reading and highlights Hume’s nonreductionist approach to 
causation, his claims being confined to “a vaguely Kantian” phenomenal world (249). 
Eric Watkins discusses Kant’s views on causality in Chapter Nine. Kant justifies fundamental 
causal principles transcendentally: these principles are synthetic a priori propositions required for the 
very possibility of experience (258) and involving epistemic necessity (as opposed to logical necessity or 
psychological compulsion). Watkins reconstructs Kant’s picture of causality as follows: substances bring 
about changes by means of the temporally indeterminate activity of their causal powers. Because of his 
distinctive ontology (linked to his own version of Newtonian physics), Kant has only a reply to, but not a 
direct refutation of, Hume’s position on causality as constant conjunction (278). Furthermore, Kant 
reintroduces final causes for the purpose of explanation in life sciences: in natural organisms there is 
reciprocal causal interaction between the parts and the whole.      
The third and final part of this anthology covers contemporary views of causation divided into 
two competing camps: Humean (non-disposition-based theories of causation) and Neo-Aristotelian 
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(dispositional theories). Douglas Ehring’s article surveys the many available versions of Humean 
positions focusing on the causal relation and touching just in passing on the causal relata. Ehring 
discusses regularity theory (defended by Hume, Davidson, Mackie), David Lewis’ counterfactual theory, 
probabilistic theory (espoused by Reichenbach, Good, and Suppes), process theory (presented by 
Aronson; Fair, Castaneda, Salmon, Dowe, etc.) and manipulability theory (proponents of which are 
Collingwood. Gasking, von Wright, and Menzies).  
In the final chapter, Stephen Mumford argues that Neo-Aristotelians (so labeled because of their 
similarities to Aristotle’s philosophy of nature) consider Humeanism inadequate since the latter’s 
supervenience doctrine gets the direction of explanation the wrong way around: it is powers or 
dispositions present in things that account for the regularities that we do notice (318). The following 
point-by-point contrast of Humean and Neo-Aristotelian theories can be extracted from Mumford’s 
paper: a metaphysics of dicreta versus a metaphysics of continua; a perdurantist against an endurantist 
account of change; a stimulus-response model of change opposed to a mutual partnership model; a 
contingent link between cause and effect confronting a conditional necessary link; and finally, causes 
being prior to rather than simultaneous with their effects.              
This collection of essays offers a high-level picture of efficient causation starting with Aristotle, 
coming full-circle and ending with contemporary Neo-Aristotelians. The volume showcases crucial 
elements that at one point or another entered into philosophical views of efficient causation. It provides 
a useful framework for taking a fresh look at existing work on causation as presented in, to name just a 
few texts: The Oxford Handbook of Causation (OUP 2009); Causation – A User’s Guide (OUP 2013); 
Causation and Creation in Late Antiquity (Cambridge University Press 2015); Causation (Polity 2014); 
Causation and Counterfactuals (MIT 2004); Causation and Explanation (MIT 2007), etc. It also invites 
further study to fill in the details, and we can expect debates, controversies, and even stark 
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disagreements. This Oxford Philosophical Concepts anthology represents a great first step toward a 
better, since historically-situated, understanding of efficient causation. As such it is a welcome addition 
to the philosophical literature.            
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